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Abstract: In this article we approach the functioning of bureaucracy in ESDP from a 
governance perspective that also focuses on informal patterns of interaction between the 
relevant bureaucratic actors. Following the governance and related network governance 
approaches, the interplay between formal and informal patterns of interaction can help to 
overcome deadlock in policy-making and to procure effective problem-solving. This 
perspective is applied to security sector reform (SSR) in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC). SSR is one of the major emerging fields of activity within the civilian crisis 
management dimension of ESDP, that also in the DRC became a focal point in the EU’s new 
security and defence policy since its inception. However, as the EU involvement in the 
Congolese security sector reform policies illustrates, coordination and negotiation among 
European actors to overcome deadlock and produce effective problem-solving is not self-
evident or even desirable for all actors. In the case of the EU’s SSR policies in Congo, 
coordination indeed occurs between the actors that are dependent upon each other in terms of 
resources and have the willingness to jointly tackle the problems related to the SSR in the 
DRC. However, it is also often undermined by actors that prefer to engage bilaterally because 
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they possess the resources to do so and the personal relationships with the Congolese 
authorities to act more efficiently and effectively. 
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1. Introduction 
The main argument of this special issue is that, in order to understand the decision-making, 
implementation and functioning of ESDP, we need to gain a better insight into the role of 
bureaucracy in the preparation and implementation of the EU security and defence policy 
processes. In this article we argue that, in order to understand the functioning of bureaucracy 
and the increasing number of bureaucratic actors involved in ESDP, we also need to gain a 
better insight into the informal patterns of interaction between the often limited number of 
relevant bureaucratic actors that de facto run ESDP operations. We argue that ESDP and the 
role of non-elected actors in ESDP is best understood if the EU’s security and defence policy 
is seen from a governance perspective, which reveals complex processes of governing that 
involve multiple actors in the absence of a central authority (Eising and Kohler-Koch 1999, 4; 
Peters and Pierre 2009, 92). A governance perspective focuses on less hierarchical 
relationships between multiple actors operating in multiple arenas; on how interests, goals and 
actions are coordinated; on how to overcome the deadlock of rigid decision-making regimes; 
and on the particular policy outcomes in which these interactions result.  
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In this research, we therefore turn to a rather underexplored approach in the field of EU 
foreign policy – the governance and network governance approach – in order to gain an 
insight into the underlying dynamics and mechanisms of ESDP and explain how and why 
there is a certain policy outcome towards the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In line 
with the dual ambition of this special issue, this article aims to enhance the academic debate 
in two ways. Firstly, it aims to advance the theoretical debate about the role of non-elected 
actors in ESDP by applying the governance and network governance literature to ESDP – 
thereby complementing the contribution of Mérand, Hofmann and Irondelle (2010) in this 
special issue. Secondly, this article aspires to contribute to the empirically informed academic 
literature on ESDP administrative governance by examining the EU role as a crisis manager 
in one specific case: security sector reform (SSR) and, more specifically, police reform in 
DRC studies.  
 
Both the issue area (security sector reform) and the third country (DRC) that have been 
selected for this case-study have a wider relevance for the study of ESDP. Security sector 
reform is one of the major emerging fields of activity within the civilian crisis management 
dimension of ESDP, with operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, fYROM, Kosovo, Moldova, 
Georgia, the DRC, Guinea-Bissau, the Palestinian Territories, Iraq, Indonesia and 
Afghanistan (Council of the EU 2009). Although these missions are not always formally 
labelled as SSR as such, most civilian crisis management operations of ESDP are situated in 
the domain of the security sector, encompassing support to the military structures, police and 
judicial sector (for an overview see Nowak 2006; Spence and Fluri 2008). The analysis 
presented in this article therefore has a wider relevance for a broader number of ESDP/CSDP 
missions. Moreover, these operations are mostly deployed in countries or regions with similar 
post-conflict characteristics and problems. 
 
Security sector reform is a broad concept that goes beyond traditional military actors and 
activities. As a multidimensional policy, it involves various actors, including civil society and 
other non-state actors, at multiple levels of government, for its formulation and 
implementation, and is at the same time directed to various actors involved in security in the 
country at stake. Given this complexity, the SSR process (from formulation to implementation 
and beyond) can thus theoretically best be understood from a governance perspective. It 
relates to “all state institutions and other entities with a role in ensuring the security of the 
state and its people” (European Commission 2006a, 5). In this sense, all ESDP missions that 
aim at supporting security institutions and structures in their development and reform can be 
classified as security sector reform missions. Under security institutions we understand 
military structures, police structures, judicial and rule of law institutions, border protection 
structures, etc. What does not fall under the SSR definition is the direct involvement or 
participation of European soldiers in conflict, which the EU did for instance in its operations 
Concordia (fYROM), Artemis (DRC) and EUFOR Tchad/RCA (Chad).  
 
The study of ESDP operations in DRC is relevant as it is the country outside the European 
continent that gained most attention from the EU’s new security and defence policy since the 
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ESDP’s inception. Moreover, using ESDP operations in a non-European country as a case 
study also has the advantage of excluding considerations and factors related to potential EU 
membership. Security sector reform is one of the most important challenges for the Congolese 
authorities and the international community, reflecting problems, challenges and dilemmas 
the international and national authorities are also confronted with in other parts of the world 
(see Dobbins et al. 2008; Spence and Fluri 2008). The analysis of the SSR in the DRC can 
therefore also contribute to a better understanding of SSR in other third countries. 
 
The next section of this article links to the governance and the network governance literature 
and pays particular attention to the foreign, security and defence policy within this literature. 
The third section points to the main features of the governance approach and analyses what 
this means within the context of ESDP. The last section applies this conceptual framework to 
the specific case of security sector reform in the DRC. The analysis in this article is based on 
multiple sources: official documents and academic literature; interviews with civil servants 
and diplomats of the Council, the Commission, EU member states and the DRC; and on a 
study visit of one of the authors to the DRC in September 2009. The interviews were 
conducted in Brussels in the period from April to August 2009 and in December 2009, and in 
Kinshasa between 8 and 28 September 20091.    
 
2. Governance in the European Union  
Conceptualizations of governance have mushroomed in the research and literature on 
European Union policy-making and politics (see for instance Kohler-Koch and Eising 1999, 
Kohler-Koch 2003 and 2008, Hooghe and Marks 2001, Christiansen and Piattoni 2003, 
Verdun and Croci 2005, Bache and Flinders 2005, Tömmel and Verdun 2009, Peters and 
Pierre 2009). Peters and Pierre (2009, 92) define governance as “an extremely complex 
process involving multiple actors pursuing a wide range of individual and organizational 
goals, as well as pursuing the collective goals of the society”. For Tömmel and Verdun, 
European governance is characterized by “the highly diversified EU procedures and practices, 
combining formalized modes of rule-setting with informal practices of negotiation, 
cooperation and consensus-building; the multilevel and multi-actor structure underlying these 
procedures and practices, and, not the least, the diverging patterns of implementation under a 
common umbrella” (2009, 1).  
 
A specific mode of governance has been conceptualized as network governance. Networks 
reflect “structural relationships, interdependencies and dynamics between actors in politics 
and policy-making” (Börzel 1998, 258-259). As noted by Börzel “networks can provide 
additional, informal linkage between the inter- and intra-organizational decision-making 
arenas. Such informal linkages, based on communication and trust, overlap with 
institutionalized structures of co-ordination and link different organizations independently 
from the formal relationships between them”. Moreover, as networks provide redundant 
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possibilities for interaction and communication, they can be used to solve decision-making 
problems and overcome the structural dilemma of bargaining systems (Börzel 1998, 262). 
Networks can take very different forms, depending on variables such as membership, 
frequency of interaction, continuity, level of integration, distribution of resources (Rhodes and 
Marsh 1992a, 1992b). Central to network governance is the efficient and effective problem-
solving orientation of particular actors in a fragmented but highly interwoven policy 
environment. The functionality of network governance relies on its capacity to manage 
differentiation, to upgrade common interests in the process of negotiation and, in the end, to 
increase the ability to act (Kohler-Koch 1999, 25-26). An important factor in explaining the 
effectiveness of networks is that, while individual network participants are agents of 
organization, inter-organizational relations are also strengthened by interpersonal links 
(Marsh and Rhodes 1992b, 261-262). 
 
Research on governance and network governance in the EU is mainly focused on the internal 
EU policy domains and first pillar cases in which the ‘community method’ prevails (Peterson 
2004, Skogstad 2003, Falkner 2000). However, as is also noted by Kohler-Koch and 
Rittberger (2006, 32), ‘governance’ and ‘foreign, security and defence policy’ is a 
combination that has hardly been studied. EU foreign policy, including the CFSP and ESDP, 
is mostly seen as a ‘high politics’ domain in which member states are the key players and 
policies are the result of a predominantly intergovernmental process. Only a limited number 
of publications analyse network governance in the EU’s external, foreign and security policy 
(Pfetsch 1998, Collinson 1999, Filtenborg, Gänzle and Johansson 2002, Krahmann 2003, 
Knodt 2004, Elgström and Jönsson 2005, Jönsson and Strömvik 2005, Kohler-Koch 2005). 
However, in most of these cases the term ‘governance’ is used without these authors applying 
the conceptualisations of the governance or network governance literature on foreign policy 
(see Keukeleire and Justaert 2010).  
 
This theoretical literature is less often applied to the specific field of ESDP. In this article we 
therefore intent to elaborate this underexplored field of research. The next section analyses 
some of the main features of the governance approach within the context of ESDP: the 
involvement of multiple relevant actors, the importance of resource dependencies between 
these actors, and multiple patterns of interaction which are focussed on overcoming deadlock 
and on effective problem-solving. 
 
3. Governance in ESDP 
3.1. Multiple actors in a multilevel, multi-pillar and multi-location governance system 
Governance reflects a more cooperative and coordinative way of ‘managing’ among a variety 
of actors, rather than authoritative ‘governing’ and hierarchical intervention. In addition to 
attention for formal rules and procedures, governance concentrates on various forms and 
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settings for coordination and cooperation among multiple actors as a mode of joint policy-
making for collective problems (Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2006, 39).  
 
Applied to ESDP, this implies that it is not sufficient to focus on the bureaucratic structures 
and procedures that have been established in Brussels in order to ‘govern’ the EU’s new 
security and defence policy. As other articles in this special issue emphasise, the High 
Representative and the Special Representatives, the Council Secretariat-General, the Political 
and Security Committee, the specialized Working Groups and the various other new 
bureaucratic structures within the orbit of the Council are surely important in terms of policy 
preparation, decision-making, implementation as well as in terms of socialisation of the new 
member states (see also Duke and Vanhoonacker 2006; Juncos and Pomorska 2008). 
However, they cannot on their own account for the output and outcome of the EU’s security 
and defence policy. Adopting a governance approach helps us to see that a wider set of actors 
have to be taken into account, including multiple actors that are not always part of or that are 
not always that visible within the main bureaucratic structures that have been established to 
govern ESDP. Which are these relevant actors within the European administrative governance 
system in the field of crisis management? 
 
Firstly, both the number and the nature of national actors that are involved in ESDP is 
seriously broadened beyond the group of diplomats that is traditionally linked to the EU’s 
foreign and security policy or that traditionally populates the Council structures. At the 
national level, the military crisis management conducted within the framework of the ESDP 
implies the involvement of the Ministries of Defence and of the various military structures of 
the member states. On the EU level, this has been translated in well-organized military 
structures, including the EU Military Committee, the EU Military Staff, the Political-Military 
Group, etc. More complex and diffuse are the actors involved in civilian crisis management. 
These include actors from the national Ministries of Interior Affairs, of Justice, of Finance, of 
Development Cooperation as well as from the operational police, judicial, and customs 
structures and specialized agencies of the member states – each with their own procedures, 
approaches and cultures. From each of these national bureaucracies, civilian crisis 
management requires bureaucrats from the capitals to prepare, implement and assure the 
follow-up of decision-making (both in their own country and in the EU’s bureaucratic 
structures in Brussels) as well as people from the various national operational structures who 
are able to prepare and particularly implement and assure the follow-up of policies in the 
field. The latter refers to qualified police officers, judges, and other civilian specialists who 
are leaving the national and Brussels arena to conduct the civilian crisis management 
operations in the specific context of the Balkans, Africa, Middle East, etc. This points to the 
major challenges in terms of coordination of this multiplicity of actors of both the national 
and EU authorities operating in the member states’ capitals, the EU institutions and 
specifically in the domain of foreign policy the actors operating in the representations and 
delegations in third countries. However, paradoxically, the civilian bureaucratic structures 
developed within the framework of ESDP are much less developed than the military 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2010-006a.htm   6 
 
EIoP  © 2010 by Arnout Justaert and Stephan Keukeleire 
 
structures – leading to a higher need for complementary or alternative coordination 
mechanisms in the EU (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008, 181-185; Quille et al. 2006). 
 
Secondly, EU member states are not only active through the EU’s political and bureaucratic 
structures but also through direct bilateral relations with third countries. This implies that in 
the individual member states the various national bureaucratic actors mentioned above can 
also be involved in crisis management initiatives in third countries independent from the EU 
framework. And to make things even more complicated: the national actors involved in the 
multilateral deliberations on security sector initiatives in the ESDP setting in Brussels and in 
the implementation of these ESDP policies abroad can be different from the national actors 
that are involved in the bilateral initiatives of that member state. The case of the UK can help 
to illustrate this, with this example also being relevant for our case-study on SSR in the DRC. 
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) is the central actor in ESDP meetings on 
civilian crisis management operations and in organising the British contribution to the 
implementation of these policies. However, in the UK’s bilateral policy towards particularly 
developing countries – including with regard to SSR – the central national actor is the 
Department for International Development (DFID), which falls under the responsibility of the 
Secretary of State for International Development and which manages Britain's aid to poor 
countries (UK, DFID 2009). In pursuing its goals, the DFID works with governments of 
developing countries, charities, businesses and international bodies, including the World 
Bank, the UN agencies and the European Commission – which also points to the need of 
coordination and attuning policies. The importance of DFID becomes clear when considering 
that it works in 150 countries, has 2,600 staff (half of whom work abroad) and 64 offices 
overseas. And this has to be seen within the very extensive diplomatic network of the UK 
that, just as France and Germany (and the Commission) has more than 110 embassies or 
external delegations in non-EU countries. This is quite a contrast with the majority of the EU 
member states that have less than 60 embassies and have a much more limited budget, staff 
and expertise at their disposal (see table 5.2 in Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008, 134). The 
latter also points to another factor that is crucial for understanding the bureaucratic 
governance in the field of crisis management: the considerable differences between the 
member states in terms of capabilities and resources.  
 
Thirdly, in the case of civilian crisis management, first pillar actors and the European 
Commission in particular are more involved than one would expect from a purely institutional 
or legal point of view. Politically and financially, through its executive function within the 
first pillar and through its control of the EU budget, the European Commission can rely on a 
quite extensive and stable arsenal of instruments. One the one hand, there are the various 
agreements and partnerships with other countries and regions in the world and the related 
respective financial instruments, such as the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) the European 
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) and the European Development Fund 
(EDF). These increasingly also touch upon areas such as good governance, rule of law, 
capacity building and policy reforms in the field of security and justice, which provides a 
basis for the Community and the Commission in particular to be directly or indirectly 
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involved in matters that touch upon SSR (see, for instance, art. 33 of the Cotonou Agreement, 
EU-ACP 2005). On the other hand, a number of more specific policy instruments, such as the 
Instrument for Stability (IFS) and the African Peace Facility (APF), allow the Commission to 
support a range of both military and civilian crisis management activities, including in the 
field of security sectors (Keukeleire and MacNaugthan 2008, 116-119, 219-223; Buxton 
2008, 27-37). Within the Commission multiple DG’s are involved, each with their own 
agenda, own approaches, and own procedural and legal frameworks – which leads to turf 
battles as well as the need for coordination both within the Commission and between these 
DG’s and other actors. DG RELEX is involved in conflict prevention and stability 
programmes in third countries and has been equipped with a Conflict Prevention and Crisis 
Management Unit. DG Development, which also manages the EDF, is politically and 
financially the most important actor when it comes to the relations with the ACP group of 
countries (including countries in which ESDP operations have been deployed, such as the DR 
Congo). The Commission can also rely on an extensive diplomatic network with over 120 
delegations in third countries, which explains why the Commission is not only a potentially 
relevant actor in the decision-making process in Brussels but also in the preparatory and 
operational implementation stage in the field.  
 
A fourth set of crucial actors in the ESDP’s wider governance system are the multiple other 
international organisations and forums, such as the UN, NATO, the OSCE, the World Bank, 
IMF, and the many (sub)regional institutions. Most security challenges are indeed tackled by 
a wider set of international organizations, which is logical in view of the multifaceted nature 
of most foreign policy challenges, the different mandates and resources of the various 
international organizations, and – important – the different organizational preferences of the 
member states. This is what we refer to as ‘multi-location’ foreign policy (Wallace 2005, 78; 
Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008, 31-32). The result is that nearly all foreign policy actions 
undertaken by the EU, including SSR activities, are developed in parallel to the actions of 
other international organizations or are elaborated on the initiative or within the framework of 
other organisations such as the UN or the African Union. This multi-location nature of foreign 
policy-making explains the strong need to coordinate policy with other international 
organizations and other relevant third countries – both on the general level (objectives and 
strategies) and the level of the nitty-gritty of implementing specific policy initiatives in the 
field. However, since the EU as a whole is not formally a member of these organisations, it 
often depends on the Presidency of the Council or on the represented EU member states to 
bridge activities of multiple international organisations (Wouters et al. 2006; Smith and 
Laatikainen 2006).  
 
Fifth, besides international organisations, also individual third countries are involved in 
specific security dossiers. In the main foreign policy dossiers – such as Afghanistan, the 
Balkans and the Middle East – the US, Russia and other big players are involved. Yet, in 
specific security dossiers – such as SSR in the DRC, Guinea-Bissau, etc. – also regional 
powers and small or medium-sized states can be important actors (such as South-Africa, 
Angola and Norway). For the development and implementation of the EU’s SSR policies, this 
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implies that also relations with these players are important. The EU has developed an 
extensive and regular dialogue with other major partners. However, this dialogue is often 
mainly focused on bilateral relations and on the main issues on the international agenda, and 
less on specific foreign policy issues such as civilian crisis management or SSR in third 
countries. This also explains why coordination often depends on the mutual relations and 
initiatives of the diplomats and civil servants in the field (this means in the third country 
where, for example, SSR programmes are implemented). 
 
Sixth, in many sectors of civilian crisis management (including SSR), know-how is provided 
to governments and institutions by various non-governmental actors: NGOs, research centres 
and think tanks, private consultancies, and multinational corporations that dispose of 
technical expertise and manpower. Not only international actors, such as the European 
Commission, but also individual states rely on NGOs and consultancies to implement, for 
instance, SSR policies in third countries. As the case-study on the DRC shows, the UK’s 
Department for International Development contracted several private consultancy 
organisations (such as PricewaterhouseCoopers), to implement the SSR projects. It is obvious 
that the involvement of this kind of actors poses specific challenges with regard to 
coordination. Particularly specialized business actors, such as consultancies, are in general 
much less visible to the outside world and often have other more business oriented approaches 
than many of the other relevant actors.  
 
Last but not least, the most crucial actor for the development and implementation of crisis 
management policies and for effective international coordination is the target country itself. 
This actor, however, is often disregarded in the policy process, not only in Brussels but also in 
deliberations in the UN and other forums of security policy-making. It is the target country 
that in principle should take the lead and needs to monitor and steer foreign interventions 
from other countries, on the basis of national strategies, priorities and action plans. However, 
these countries often do neither have the tradition nor the capacities (in terms of staff, 
financial resources, logistics and expertise) to assume this role. They also often do not feel 
sufficiently strong vis-à-vis the external actors to uphold the principle of ownership. 
Moreover, also the target countries are in fact fragmented, with multiple actors, ministries and 
security actors being involved in the adoption and reception (or rejection) of SSR policies. It 
is clear that this again poses multiple challenges in terms of internal and external 
coordination. 
3.2. Resource dependencies, overcoming deadlock and effective problem-solving 
The previous overview of multiple actors in a multilevel, multi-pillar and multi-location 
governance system shows clearly that the development and implementation of security and 
defence policies, such as SSR programmes, is more complex than one would assume from a 
purely formal institutional point of view and that this goes beyond the formal ESDP actors 
and structures. Various factors determine the extent to which the formal institutional 
frameworks are complemented by governance systems which also include informal practices 
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of negotiations, cooperation and coordination. These factors include resource dependency and 
power, the need to overcome deadlock or other obstacles in the formal institutional settings, 
and the need to coordinate to achieve effective problem-solving – dimensions which are 
further elaborated in this section. 
 
Both the complexity and interconnectedness of policy issues and the dispersion of problem-
solving capabilities bring together the multiple actors operating at multiple levels and 
locations. Complexity and interconnectedness are two central themes in the governance 
approach (Rhodes 1999). Solutions for policy problems, especially in the domain of security 
and defence cannot be found within the boundaries of a single political location. Not only 
between the EU and its member states, but also beyond EU levels of governance, resource 
interdependencies exist and require coordination and mediation between diverging interests, 
objectives, strategies, and pooling capabilities. Central to the notion of interdependency is the 
concept of power. Power determines to a large extent the position an actor occupies or takes 
in its relations and interactions with other actors. It refers to the possession of policy-specific 
resources and the degree of dependency among actors. As power is defined in terms of 
“policy-specific capacity to act” (Kohler-Koch 1999, 31), it is clear that the distribution of 
resources and, consequently, the potential relevance of the actors will be different for each 
foreign policy dossier. More concretely: the availability and distribution of problem-solving 
capacities will be different for SSR in Kosovo than for reform in DRCongo or 
Aceh/Indonesia, just as also the needs and ambitions with regard to SSR in these three 
countries will vary substantially. Power should also be understood in terms of institutional 
and personal relationships of the external actors with the relevant local actors. The capacity to 
act and to implement effectively problem-solving policies is to a large extent dependent on 
the reception, involvement and acceptance of the target country itself. Our case-study on the 
DRC demonstrates that significant differences can exist among European actors in the nature 
and depth of the relations with the local authorities, which has an impact on the relations 
between the various European actors, on their power relations and on the degree of mutual 
dependency.  
 
Within the context of the EU, it is clear that in many cases of crisis management and SSR, 
only a limited number of actors can be considered as relevant. It is obvious that the largest 
member states, particularly France, the UK and Germany, not only have more interests in 
problem-solving in a larger number of third countries and foreign policy issues, but can also 
rely on a much wider arsenal of problem-solving capabilities and a more developed 
bureaucratic and diplomatic framework to elaborate and implement policies (Keukeleire and 
MacNaughtan 2008, 124-141). However, this picture has to be nuanced, as this does not mean 
that governance systems developed in the context of EU’s external policies will only consist 
of the largest members or that the largest member states will always be involved. As power is 
defined in terms of “policy-specific capacity to act”, networks can also include small or 
medium-sized member states which can possess the required policy-specific problem-solving 
capabilities. These countries can prove to be relevant players in specific third countries as a 
result of historical links, privileged political or economic contacts, or because this third 
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country has been chosen as one of the main partner countries in, for instance, this member 
states’ development budget (Keukeleire 2006). In short, the question is not whether a country 
is small or large, but whether a country is relevant for a specific foreign policy matter and can 
provide an added-value in terms of mobilizing relevant problem-solving resources.  
 
The degree of dependency among actors on the resources of other actors is, in addition to the 
availability of policy-specific resources, a second major factor that determines the power of 
actors and the constitution of governance systems or network governance. Resource 
dependency between relevant actors and the mobilization of resources necessary to tackle 
specific policy issues are indeed core elements of governance (Börzel 1998, 263). However, 
as Sørensen and Torfing emphasise, “there might be an asymmetrical allocation of material 
and immaterial resources amongst the actors, meaning that some are stronger and more 
central than others”. Moreover, “since participation is voluntary and exit always remains a 
possibility, and since the actors are depending on each other in order ‘to get things done’, 
nobody can command or force anybody else in the manner possible within a system of 
hierarchical rule” (2005, 203). This is an important though often neglected observation: 
effective governance systems will indeed only emerge when also the most powerful actors – 
in terms of possessing problem-solving capacities – will experience the same resource 
dependency and will thus consider governance systems as useful or unavoidable. Our case-
study on SSR in DRCongo will demonstrate that this is not always the case, with the stronger 
problem-solving capabilities of some countries undermining the governance systems that 
other actors consider as essential. 
 
Another dimension that contributes to the creation of governance systems is the extent to 
which the various relevant actors see the need to overcome obstacles within complex 
institutional settings and even deadlock in formal policy-making. This depends on whether 
actors consider that they have to resort to what Héritier (1997, 172) labels as “subterfuge”: the 
creative use of informal strategies to avoid deadlock in formal policy-making. Through its 
focus on less hierarchical and informal practices of policy-making in addition to formal 
regimes, and on mediation, coordination and cooperation among a variable number of actors, 
governance indeed entails the potential to overcome deadlock in complex formal institutional 
settings and to contribute to effective problem-solving. Analysing the institutional setup of the 
ESDP makes clear that this is even more complex and contains even more potential obstacles 
and risks of deadlock than is the case in internal EU policy domains, where competences are 
more clear defined and delimited. This is the result of the multi-actor and multilevel character 
of ESDP and particularly of the purely intergovernmental character of the ESDP framework, 
with unanimity being required in the multiplicity of bodies, committees and substructures (see 
Vanhoonacker, Dijkstra and Maurer 2010). Moreover, as has been argued above, crisis 
management and security sector policies in particular do not exclusively emanate from the 
traditional CFSP/ESDP actors, but also need the involvement of a variety of other actors: 
from within the member states, from the Commission, other international organisations and 
non-governmental organisations. As important differences exist among these actors in terms 
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of interests, priorities, agendas, approaches, there is a pressing need for mediation and 
coordination between all these actors.  
 
The overview of actors in the previous section indeed indicated that there are multiple 
challenges in terms of coordination, mediation and possibly also pooling of resources. This 
was also recognized in the EU’s European Security Strategy of 2003 which pointed to the 
challenge “to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: European assistance 
programmes and the European Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from 
Member States and other instruments”. It also emphasised that all efforts “should follow the 
same agenda” and that “[i]n a crisis there is no substitute for unity of command” (European 
Council 2003, 13). However the reality is that, in practice, there is not only no unity of 
command but, even more problematic, even no formalized structures to bring together and try 
to coordinate and mediate in function of effective problem-solving – which also points to the 
importance of fully using the integrative potential of the new institutional provisions of the 
Lisbon Treaty (Justaert and Nasra 2008, Whitman and Juncos 2009). The same is true on a 
broader international level: although some new mechanisms have been developed for 
structured coordination between for instance the EU and the UN, no effective institutionalized 
settings exist that bring together all relevant actors from the EU, from other international 
organisations and countries, and/or from non-governmental actors. 
 
The limitations or outright absence of formal inter-organizational co-ordination mechanisms 
leads to the context in which governance systems can emerge as an adequate setting for 
coordination, mediation and pooling of resources. It is in these contexts that formalized 
modes of policy-making can be complemented or substituted by informal practices of 
negotiation, cooperation and consensus-building. This already indicates that governance 
systems can be quite diffuse: it can lead to a situation in which multiple (parallel, competing 
or complementary) governance systems can emerge or can be promoted by specific actors – 
depending on the nature of the relationship and mutual dependency of the various relevant 
actors. It is clear that such a situation with multiple overlapping interactions and negotiation 
systems (Börzel 2007, 3-4) does not necessarily lead to an increase in the problem-solving 
capabilities of the international community – despite the fact that governance systems 
precisely emerge to increase the chance of effective policy-making and problem-solving. 
 
In the following section we will assess the relevance and assumptions of informal governance 
for the implementation of the European security sector policies in the DR Congo. Analogue to 
the theoretical elaboration, we subsequently deal with the multitude of actors involved, their 
interdependent relations and the way in which deadlock in the implementation and 
effectiveness of policies is tackled. 
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4. EU’s Security Sector Reform Policies in the DRC 
4.1. EU involvement in Congolese SSR 
For the Congolese government, the states of the Great Lakes Region and the members of the 
international donor community, security in the DRC remains the most important challenge for 
the development of the country. Its process of SSR, which has started with the transition in 
2003, is an all encompassing and interconnected process. In addition to conventional security 
actors (army, police and intelligence), these include, in the broad definition, “all those 
organizations considered with the provision of security, such are judiciary, private security 
guards and paramilitary forces” (Radoman 2008, 5). SSR activities concentrate on three 
priorities in the DRC: (1) defence, i.e. demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) 
of former combatants into the society and the security sector, and the reform of rebel and 
paramilitary groups into conventional army brigades and security forces, (2) the police, and 
(3) the law and judicial system. To be effective and sustainable, SSR also includes the reform 
of the management and oversight bodies of this sector, and is thus also related to principles of 
‘good governance’ and ‘democracy promotion’ (Keane 2008, 220-224). 
 
Although the Union is a relatively new player in international security and defence, it has in 
only six years (2003-2009) undertaken a substantial number of operations in various parts in 
the world (see the introductory article of Vanhoonacker, Dijkstra and Maurer 2010). In the 
DRC, five operations have been deployed since 2003, two military operations (Artemis and 
EUFOR Kinshasa) and three civilian (EUPOL Kinshasa, EUSEC DRC and EUPOL DRC). 
Both EUSEC DRC and EUPOL DRC are still ongoing. Following the elaborated definition on 
SSR, it is clear that EUSEC RDC, EUPOL Kinshasa and EUPOL RDC are missions in the 
field of security sector reform. Operation Artemis and EUFOR RDC were two missions that, 
on request of the UN, intervened directly in the security situation of the DRC, and will 
therefore not be classified as SSR operations (see also Ulriksen, Gourlay and Mace 2004; 
Duke 2009). 
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Table 1 – ESDP operations in the DR Congo 
Operation Artemis 
(DR Congo, 2003) 
 
Military 
autonomous  
(EU Operational 
HQ in France) 
1,700 forces 
EUPOL KINSHASA 
(DR Congo, 2005-2007) 
SSR / Police Approx 30 staff 
EUFOR RD CONGO 
(DR Congo, 2006) 
Military 
autonomous 
(EU Operational 
HQ in Germany) 
Over 1,000 forces; a rapid 
force available 
EUSEC RD CONGO 
(DRC, 2005-2009) 
SSR / Army 60 staff 
EUPOL RD Congo 
(DR Congo, 2007-2010) 
SSR / Police 53 international and 9 local 
staff 
 Source: Council 2009 
 
In 2005 the EU launched a first civilian ESDP mission that focused on SSR in the DRC: 
EUPOL Kinshasa. This was a civilian mission in support of the Congolese security sector 
reform, which was one of the key pillars during the Congolese transition process, and is still 
the most pressing challenge for the country’s stability. EUPOL Kinshasa was launched to 
monitor, mentor and advise the integrated police units (IPU) until the national elections. The 
mission ended in 2007, and was succeeded by EUPOL RDC in the same year. The mandate of 
EUPOL RDC is larger than the mandate of its predecessor and is foreseen to end in 2010. 
While EUPOL Kinshasa concentrated on the creation of the IPU in Kinshasa as foreseen in 
the Global and Inclusive Agreement (signed in 2002 by the conflicting parties under pressure 
of the international community, Inter-Congolese Dialogue 2002), EUPOL RDC supports the 
entire Congolese National Police and its reform process in terms of concepts and training. The 
European Commission funded an important part of these civilian ESDP missions, and among 
the EU member states, especially the UK, France and Belgium have played – and still play – a 
key role in these missions and the reform of the Congolese police sector in general, both in 
financial and operational terms (Martinelli 2006; Cosidó Gutiérrez 2006). 
 
In 2005, the Union also deployed another SSR operation, the EUSEC RDC mission, which is 
a civilian advisory and assistance mission for security reform that concentrates on the reform 
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and stability of the national Congolese army (FARDC – Forces Armées de la République 
Démocratique du Congo). The mission was launched after an official request from the 
Congolese transitional government. Especially Belgium, the former colonial ruler, actively 
engaged in the Congolese army integration and has undertaken, even before the launch of the 
operation EUSEC RDC, several missions on its own initiative to train integrated brigades for 
the Congolese Army (International Crisis Group 2006, 19). 
 
The UN Secretary-General in December 2008 again requested the EU to send a bridging force 
to the DRC awaiting the enforcement of MONUC. However, the EU this time failed to agree 
on the bridging mission and did not take on its international responsibilities in a transition 
process in which it has been deeply involved since the start and in which it has attempted to 
manifest itself as a credible security and defence actor. This non-action can be attributed to 
the facts that on the one hand the member states held different perceptions on the necessity of 
another mission to the country, and the lack of military capabilities on the other hand. The 
countries that were in favour of a bridging force, such as Belgium, were not able to account 
for the necessary military capabilities themselves, and those member states that opposed the 
mission, such as France and the UK were not willing to deploy their capabilities given the fact 
that they are more intensively involved in other military operations (such as the UK in Iraq 
and Afghanistan). 
 
The relative rapid succession of ESDP operations in the DRC – and of UN requests for EU 
support – followed from the expectations that were raised about the EU as a relevant security 
actor in the DRC. These expectations were raised after the creation of the ESDP and its 
successful deployment of Artemis (in terms of the rapid decision and pooling of resources) 
and after EU (EC and the member states) had proved to be one of the leading donors in the 
world towards the DRC in support of political, humanitarian and security reforms (European 
Commission 2008b). The rapid succession of ESDP operations in the DRC were also the 
result of both the interconnectedness of problems and challenges in the Congolese transition 
and the synchronic processes at multiple levels of governance. Each political decision to 
launch an ESDP operation in the DRC was indeed only one (though important) part of a 
larger set of political and operational decisions. For example, the policy-making process with 
regard to the EU support for the Congolese IPU Kinshasa was de facto a succession of policy-
making processes on both the EU and national levels (in addition to the UN level and DRC 
level): first on whether to react positively to the UN’s demand to support this IPU, then on 
what kind of support would be granted, on releasing funds from the European Development 
Fund, on releasing funds from the CFSP budget, on releasing national financial resources and 
support in kind (by national authorities), then on sending a fact-mission to evaluate the 
progress, next on launching the ESDP operation EUPOL Kinshasa, etc. Moreover, these 
subsequent steps in the policy-making process on IPU Kinshasa simultaneously also 
influenced the agenda-setting, policy proposals and actual formal decisions with regard to the 
EU’s support and engagement in other areas of the Congolese security sector reform, which is 
also the result of a circular process of interconnected policy initiatives. 
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4.2. Multiple actors in a multilevel, multi-pillar and multi-location governance system 
The previous overview clearly demonstrated that the ESDP initiatives towards the DRC are 
linked to and embedded in a broader arena of foreign policy-making that simultaneously takes 
place at multiple levels and multiple locations. The EU is only one actor to develop security 
and defence policies towards the DRC, in addition to the bilateral initiatives of its member 
states, and initiatives of other international organisations, especially the UN. Moreover, at the 
EU level, the various pillars and institutional actors as well as all member states are involved 
in these security-related policies. Both the Council and the Commission have developed 
activities and have spent an important amount of money in the reform of the security sector in 
the DRC. As the EU support to Congolese SSR demonstrates, the delineation of ESDP / EC 
security issues and competences is often not at all clear. The police mission EUPOL Kinshasa 
– that had to monitor and give advice to the Congolese IPU – is a civilian ESDP operation, 
but the preceding training of the IPU has been done under the Commission’s umbrella 
through a budget line of the European Development Fund (EDF). Through the European 
Development Fund, the EC / Commission also contributes to other police and judicial sector 
reform initiatives by providing equipment, infrastructure and technical support (European 
Commission 2008; Davis 2009b). In these processes from both the Council and the 
Commission, several member states are involved. The provision of equipment for the IPU in 
Kinshasa (uniforms, anti-riot equipment, small weapons), for example, was assured by 
Germany, Hungary and Belgium, with in the latter four Ministries being involved: Foreign 
Affairs, Defence, Home Affairs, Budget – with traditional tug-of-war that goes hand in hand 
when several governmental actors are involved (interview in Brussels 01.12.2009). 
 
The Community initiatives support or complement the Council’s ESDP missions, such as the 
support to EUPOL Kinshasa and EUPOL RDC. However, an ESDP mission such as EUPOL 
RDC has a clearly defined mandate, a limited scope (in terms of equipment and manpower) 
and operates in a relatively short period of time. The Commission on the other hand, is a more 
permanent actor with a more extensive network of permanent relations and a larger scope of 
competences (interview in Brussels 22.12.2009). Not surprisingly, this leads to inarticulate 
tensions between the Commission delegation and the Council’s police missions. In Kinshasa, 
the mandate and role of EUPOL RDC focussed in the first place on the support to the 
Congolese authorities in the conceptualization of the police reform. This support was carried 
out together with other actors from the international community, such as South-Africa, Japan 
and Angola under the lead of the Congolese authorities. Although this was not their defined 
role, EUPOL RDC, together with UNPOL (civilian part of MONUC) took the lead in this 
process, partly because the Congolese representatives lacked leadership, yet partly to take and 
anchor a more extensive role in the Congolese police reform. This role of EUPOL RDC in 
Kinshasa – were all the conceptual work took place – has almost come to an end, and other 
European and international partners are ready to take over to accompany the Congolese police 
with the implementation of the reforms. Yet, both in Brussels and Kinshasa, it seems hard to 
bring the civilian EUPOL RDC to an end. In Brussels, it is the aspiration of particular 
member states to prolong operational presence in the Congolese police reform. Yet, this did 
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not lead to a significant update or extension of its mandate. In Kinshasa, EUPOL is very keen 
to continue its role as main coordinator, although this is not shared by the other European and 
international actors on the field (interview in Kinshasa 22.09.2009; interview in Kinshasa 
23.09.2009). 
 
This should be understood in view of the UK’s presence and activism in the Congolese police 
reform. In addition to the support of the EU, also some of its member states develop security-
related policies towards the DRC on an individual basis. In the police sector, for instance, the 
UK and particularly its Department for International Development (DFID) plays an important 
role, both financially and politically. The UK was seen as probably going furthest in 
developing general security sector reform policy guidelines (International Crisis Group 2006, 
9; Davis 2009a 27-29). For the implementation of its programmes DFID cooperates with 
private consultancy organisations such as the PricewaterhouseCoopers. The involvement of 
private consultancies is remarkable and seemed to have a positive impact on the effectiveness 
of the implementation of the Congolese police reform. In addition to the UK, also other EU 
member states develop bilateral initiatives in Congolese SSR. France took, for instance, part 
in the training of the Congolese police, in particularly the Rapid Intervention Police in 2004 
and has in 2007-2008 created the “Ecole de Formation des Officiers de Police Judiciare” and 
the “Laboratoire de Police Technique et Scientifique” (interview in Kinshasa 24.09.2009). 
Belgium plays an important role in training the integrated brigades of the Congolese army, in 
which it was already engaged before the launch of operation EUSEC DRC.  
 
Apart from member states’ bilateral initiatives and efforts in the EU framework, also other 
international organisations and arenas conduct security and defence policies towards the 
DRC. The UN and its various agencies play a central role in steering the international policy 
towards the DR Congo. The EU provides active support for the UN initiatives and in some 
cases also takes responsibility for part of the implementation of UN programmes. For 
instance, a part of the Commission’s programmes are primarily aimed at supporting UN 
programmes (and NGO’s). The first military ESDP operation in Africa, Operation Artemis, 
was in support of MONUC, the UN mission in Congo, and also the EU’s support for IPU 
Kinshasa followed a request by the UN. Moreover the UN is an important framework for EU 
member states to implement policies in the Congolese police reform through the MONUC. As 
permanent members of the UN Security Council, the UK and France also play an crucial role 
through this framework. In addition to the UN, also other international or regional 
organisations play a role in the Congolese police sector. Important in this respect is the 
support from the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC), the latter chaired for two years (since September 2009) by the Congolese President 
Joseph Kabila, that are increasingly important as regional players in safeguarding the 
continent’s security. 
 
Specifically in the Congolese SSR process, also other international actors are involved in 
particular projects. Bilaterally, USAid concentrates on the reform of the military and judicial 
sectors, and has in 2007 cooperated with the European Commission and the International 
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Organisation for Migrants (IOM) on the formation and functioning of the Congolese border 
police. Furthermore, also the Japanese, South-African and Angolan governments are involved 
in the reform of the Congolese security sector. For South Africa and Angola, that are both 
members of the AU and the SADC, the intensive participation is part of a broader strategy to 
create more African ownership in international development policies towards the continent. 
4.3. Resource dependencies, overcoming deadlock and effective problem-solving 
The presence of this multitude of actors and projects illustrates the intensive involvement of 
the international community, and in particular of the EU and its member states. At the same 
time, these actors are driven by various interests, priorities, agendas and, most importantly 
dispose of diverse instruments and capabilities to realise their goals. Clearly, there exists a 
strong need for coordination among these actors’ capabilities, agendas, actions and goals (see 
also Kassim, Menon, Peters and Wright 2001; Olsen 2007). However, coordination is a major 
challenge at and among multiple levels of governance. Especially in view of the varying 
(sometimes difficult) relations between different actors, both institutional and personal, 
coordination is hard to institutionalize and to be moved beyond a mere exchange of views.  
 
The considerable financial capabilities necessary for the implementation of the police reform 
programme, approximately €1000 million for the coming 15 years (MONUC 28.04.2010), 
and the significant differences in the donors’ efforts in financial, logistic or immaterial terms, 
create important dependencies among these actors. This shows especially in programmatic 
terms when progress of one actor’s efforts depends on the activities of other actors. In this 
way, dependency entails the risk of an implementation deadlock when coordination among 
the interdependent actors lacks. However, at the same time, the differences among the actors 
in financial terms can also diminish the willingness to coordinate and can risk to create a 
‘competition’ among the actors to implement solely ‘their’ programmes and priorities. This 
holds especially true for the biggest investors, such as the UK.  
 
The UK Development Agency DFID provided more than £8 million for the training and 
equipment of the police, especially in the wake of the elections. Also after the elections, DFID 
has the most important budget in Congolese SSR. In the coming five years, the UK devotes 
£80 million to Congolese SSR in its “Security Sector Accountability and Police Reform” 
programme: £30 million for accountability and oversight capacity of security institutions, £40 
million for the police reform, and £10 million for defence reform (UK, DFID 2008, 5). For 
the implementation of this programme, more than half of this amount, £45 million, has been 
granted to PricewaterhouseCoopers that has been given the responsibility to accompany the 
Congolese police in its reform (£40 million) and strengthen good governance and oversight 
capacity in security institutions (£5 million). Financially, PricewaterhouseCoopers is a more 
important actor than any of the other EU member states in the Congolese police reform 
(interview in Kinshasa 19.09.2009). Operationally, it has much more a business and output 
oriented approach in the implementation of its programme than most of the member states. It 
has been granted a first slice of this budget, and will be evaluated by DFID after two years. 
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Hence, this private consultancy is in Kinshasa to produce clearly defined, visible and 
measurable results and has no time to loose in this process. In comparison, the civilian ESDP 
mission that is involved in the Congolese police reform, EUPOL RDC has ‘only’ a budget of 
6.02 million Euros and France contributed with 3 million Euros for the creation of the ‘Ecole 
de Formation de Officiers de Police Judicaires’ and the ‘Laboratoire de Police Technique et 
Scientifique’, in addition to its contribution to the ESDP missions. In this field, the 
contributions of the EU and the other EU member states remain significantly below the UK 
budget. 
 
The case of Congo’s SSR illustrates the potentials, but also the limitations of the EU’s 
capacity to take up its responsibilities (see also Weiler 2009; Hoebeke, Carette and 
Vlassenroot 2007). The risk of deadlock in policy-making and the difficulties of effective 
problem-solving are the result of the multitude of actors involved, their complex and 
sometimes rigid formal interaction mechanisms, their semi-overlapping loyalties and the 
significant differences in resources, priorities and approaches. This deadlock and ineffective 
problem-solving occurs for the EU at multiple levels: at the European level, between the 
Commission, the Council and the member states; at the extra-European level, between the EU 
institutions, the EU member states and other international players; and between the EU, its 
member states and the Congolese authorities. 
 
The latter is probably the most important actor as ‘owner’ and ‘leader’ of its SSR policies. 
Like all actors involved in Congolese SSR policies, the EU depends on its cooperation with 
the Congolese authorities to implement its SSR initiatives. However, in practice numerous 
problems challenge this Congolese ownership and leadership, which hampers the reception, 
implementation, and thus the effectiveness of the EU’s SSR policies towards the country. An 
important explanation is the involvement of multiple Congolese Ministries in the SSR 
programmes (interview in Brussels 28.08.2009). It involves not only the Ministries of Interior, 
Security, Justice and Defence, but also the Ministries of Finance, of Decentralisation, etc.  
 
However, the Congolese government is a very unstable one, and also at this level multiple 
problems arise with regard to coordination among these actors. First, the different ministries 
involved have different agendas, priorities, approaches, capabilities and interests in the 
different dimensions of security sector reform. Tensions arose, for instance, between the 
Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Justice on the status and the authority over the judicial 
police (OPJ) which paralysed the progress in the police reform for more than two years 
(interview in Brussels 28.08.2009). Also the relation between the police and the military 
forces is a difficult one, since the latter have traditionally a stronger role in the DRC and have 
received much more attention from the international community than the police or the judicial 
system. Second, the ministers themselves are often replaced, even multiple times a year, 
which impedes the continuity of the interactions, both at the personal and institutional level. 
Moreover, when a minister is replaced, also his cabinet is replaced and it is not unusual that 
important information disappears together with the minister and its cabinet. Third, in view of 
the vast size of the country it is a difficult job to involve all authorities from provincial and 
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local structures. In addition, the state levels are also object of an important reform plan that 
aims to restructure the Congolese decentralisation in new provinces. This restructured 
decentralisation has not yet been implemented, so coordination between the central and the 
decentralised levels are still taking place on the basis of the current structures (interview in 
Kinshasa 11.09.2009). In the future, however, coordination will continue with new actors in 
new structures. In sum, multiple factors hamper the Congolese government to take the lead in 
its SSR policies. 
 
This has important repercussions for the international and European actors that have variable 
relationships with the Congolese authorities. ‘To get things done’ implies the involvement, 
support and acceptance of the Congolese government. However, huge differences exist 
between the EU member states and institutional actors in their approach and relations with the 
Congolese authorities. This is a significant element of power in the effective realisation of 
international SSR policies in the DRC, but also has an important impact on the relations 
between the actors involved. As has been argued, among the European actors, the UK is the 
most important one, for which an important part of its policies are executed by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers. PricewaterhouseCoopers, that is keen to proceed efficiently in the 
reforms and procure results in a short period of time, managed to develop very close and 
personal relationships with the relevant Congolese officials, such as the Inspector-General of 
the national Congolese police (interview in Kinshasa 22.09.2009). Both the British and the 
Congolese government seem to prefer this bilateral relations over the multilateral 
coordination structures established in Kinshasa. 
 
EUPOL RDC and the member states that participate in it, on the other hand, take the role as 
guard and motor of the European and international coordination, mainly within the Comité de 
Suivi de la Réforme de la Police (CSRP) (interview in Kinshasa 22.09.2009). Moreover, the 
six member states that contribute personnel to EUPOL RDC – France, Belgium, Portugal, 
Italy, Sweden and the Netherlands – are those member states that are bilaterally only to a 
limited extent involved in the Congolese police reform. These actors, with EUPOL RDC on 
top try to strengthen to degree and intensity of international and European coordination, since 
the interdependency in terms of resources and problem-solving capacities is more present 
among these actors (interview in Kinshasa 22.09.2009; interview in Kinshasa 23.09.2009). 
Apart from France, these member states lack the necessary resources (material and/or 
immaterial) to conduct these SSR policies bilaterally and are therefore more dependent on 
common EU policies to pursue their specific goals. However, both their internal coordination 
and their coordination with the Congolese authorities are undermined by the possibility of 
other actors, for example the UK, to act more effectively on a bilateral basis. 
 
The deadlock is in this way created by the uncoordinated bilateral programmes of the 
members states, and the variable relations of these actors with the Congolese authorities. First, 
the various European actors involved develop different programmes based on own 
experiences and following their specific approaches and goals. This results in overlapping and 
sometimes even conflicting programmes and approaches that hamper the effective problem-
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solving of the EU. Second, the Congolese actors are confronted with these multiple external 
partners which places them in a relatively comfortable position, in which the European actors 
compete rather than coordinate their relations and interactions with the Congolese authorities, 
leading to an obstruction of effective progress. 
 
A similar trend seems to exist in reform of the defence sector (see Merket 2009). While 
EUSEC RDC presents itself as the defender of the European coordination and a common 
European approach, both particular member states – such as Belgium and France – and the 
Congolese authorities seem to prefer bilateral contacts. In the reform of the Congolese 
defence sector, these bilateral relations are even more present since there does not exist a 
Comité de Suivi in this sector. In addition to the UK, the Netherlands, Germany, Portugal, 
Sweden, Hungary, Austria and Luxemburg, France and Belgium contribute personnel to 
EUSEC RDC (Council of the European Union 2009). However in the reform of the defence 
sector, France and Belgium have been involved long before the EU and other European 
member states, and developed a wide expertise and good personal relationships with the 
competent Congolese authorities. 
 
To the reforms of the judicial sector, the EU and its member states contribute through various 
instruments and programmes to justice, human rights and the rule of law in the DRC (see 
Davis 2009a, 2009b; Aertsen et al. 2008). In particular through the Rejusco project that was 
launched in 2006 and concentrates on justice in the eastern part of the country. Its overall 
budget (€11.5 million) is financed by both the European Commission (€7.9 million) through 
its EDF and particular member states (the Netherlands, the UK and Belgium) (European 
Commission 2006b). However, also in this sector progress in addressing problems of rule of 
law, human rights and justice at all levels is not systematically supported by the Congolese 
authorities themselves. Although the Comité Mixte de la Justice (CMJ) unites all relevant 
actors involved in the sector, European coordination occurs mostly informally, among a 
limited number of actors, such as the UK, the Netherlands, France and Sweden (Davis 2009a, 
19-20). 
 
Overcoming this ‘competition’, deadlock and ineffective problem-solving seems only to be 
possible through informal governance and the interplay between informal interactions and 
formal settings. Informal meetings with only the donors indeed manage to increase mutual 
trust among them. However, these informal meetings are not regularly organised. Mostly, 
they occur when specific problems arise, such as clear incompatibilities between donors’ 
programmes or a discord in approaches. In this cases, the informal governance in the EU’s 
SSR policies in the Congo does not avoid deadlock in a systematic way, but facilitates mutual 
understanding between the donors, strengthening their position towards the Congolese 
authorities, and in this way making their problem-solving efforts more effective. 
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5. Conclusion 
This article concentrates on security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo and, 
more specifically, the EU’s activities therein. In particular, we assess the implementation of 
these activities taking a governance approach. This allows for the comprehension of the 
multitude of actors, both state and non-state, involved in the implementation, and the variety 
of interactions and relations among them. From an intergovernmental perspective on EU 
foreign policy, a central role would be expected for the traditional CFSP/ESDP actors and for 
the largest member states in the Council. First, however, the nature of SSR implies the 
involvement of a multitude of actors, also beyond the traditional security actors and concepts. 
Non-state actors, such as PricewaterhouseCoopers in the Congolese police reform, can indeed 
play a crucial role in the implementation of SSR policies. Second, the fragmented and multi-
layered nature of the EU’s foreign, security and defence policy creates multiple complexities 
in terms of instruments, capabilities, interests and goals that procures a continuous need for 
negotiation and coordination, both formal and informal. As the EU involvement in the 
Congolese security sector reform policies illustrates, coordination and negotiation among 
external European actors is not always useful and necessary to overcome deadlock and 
produce effective problem-solving. Coordination indeed occurs between the actors that have 
the willingness to jointly tackle the problems related to SSR in the DRC and that are 
dependent upon each other in terms of resources. However, it is also often undermined by 
actors that prefer to engage bilaterally because they possess the resources to do so and the 
personal relationships with the Congolese authorities to be effective. The previous analysis 
and examples in the reform of the police, the army and the judicial sector indeed illustrated 
the dependencies and power among European actors and illuminated that their patterns of 
coordination are determined by the amount of money devoted to the sector and the – often 
personal – relationships developed with the Congolese authorities. This leads us to the 
conclusion that in the field (in our case in the DRC) resource dependencies, the risk of 
deadlock in policy-making and the difficulties of effective problem-solving should first and 
foremost be understood in terms of relationship with the Congolese authorities.  
 
Finally, we want to raise the methodological challenges posed by researching the role and 
influence of civil servants and diplomats in a sensitive area such as security and defence. The 
research for this article – as part of a larger research project on European governance and SSR 
in the DRC – leads to some additional remarks. Firstly, this article points to the importance of 
detailed case-studies of specific fields of EU foreign policy. This article analysed one single 
case, which implies that we have to be prudent with regard to the generalisation of our 
conclusions. This also points to the need of having other cases being analysed through the 
same conceptual framework. Secondly, when analysing the informal dimension in a sensitive 
area such as security and defence, it is clear that it is not easy to find relevant and valid 
information sources. This indicates that studies of specific cases of EU foreign policy and 
crisis-management in particular cannot be based solely on an analysis of primary and 
secondary literature, but in the first place needs information obtained through interviews and 
– even more importantly – informal contact with the various relevant participants. The 
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relevant players will indeed often provide more easily sensitive information during informal 
contact than during formal interviews. Thirdly, it also makes clear that in order to obtain 
relevant information, the researcher must leave Brussels and the EU and do field work in the 
regions or countries that are subject to the EU’s foreign policy. This is also important in order 
to gain a better insight into who the relevant actors precisely are (which can indeed not be 
seen from a Brussels perspective) and in order to be able to talk with these various relevant 
actors – particularly actors from the third country. This need to move away from the Brussels 
and European perspective, to conduct field research and to take into account a wider variety 
of actors beyond those that are traditionally analysed obviously makes research on EU foreign 
policy more complicated and also more costly – but also much more interesting and 
rewarding.  
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1 For reasons of confidentiality, the list of interviewees is not provided in this article, but is available 
with the authors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
